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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
sunstroke occurs while the insured is pursuing his ordinary intended course
of occupation or pleasure there is no such occurrence. Paist V. Aetna Life
Ins. Co. (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1931) 54 F. (2d) 393; Nickman v. New York Life
Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1930) 39 F. (2d) 763; Semancik v. Continental Casualty
Co. (1914) 56 Pa. Super Ct. 392; Continental Casualty Co. '. Pittman (1916)
145 Ga. 641, 89 S. E. 716; see also Caldwell v. Travelers' Insurance Co. (1924)
305 Mo. 619, 267 S. W. 907; Jensma v. Sun Life Assurance Co. (C. C. A. 9,
1933) 64 F. (2d) 457; Pope v. Prudential Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1928) 29 F.
(2d) 185. Two cases contra, ostensibly based on the same principle, have
failed to distinguish between cause and effect, and have found the necessary
unforeseen occurrence in the resultant prostration and not in the course
of events producing it. Elsey v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. (1918) 187 Ind.
447, 120 N. E. 42, overruling (Ind. App. 1915) 109 N. E. 413; Bryant v.
Continental Casualty Co., above.
Almost without exception policies on which recovery for this type of in-
jury has been allowed have had special clauses stating that sunstroke shall be
an injury for which the insurer is liable if brought about by accidental
means, and while this has had little effect on the reasoning upon which the
courts have based their decisions, it has noticeably operated to influence
them in deciding whether ordinary cases of sunstroke were a risk contem-
plated by the parties at the time the contract was made. It has thus
strengthened the idea that sunstroke of all kinds, being an accident in the
view of the average insured, should be a basis of liability. The majority
and dissenting opinions in the instant case are sufficient to show that the
real issue in this and other decisions has been between the layman's
definition of an accident as an unlooked-for, unforeseeable event, mis-
chance or mishap, and the lawyer's distinction between the accident itself
and the means or cause which brought it about. Justice Cardozo recognizes
the first when he says, "When a man has died in such a way that his death is
spoken of as an accident, he has died because of an accident, and hence by
accidental means." The other side of the question is taken by Mr. Justice
Stone, speaking for the majority, "the insurance is not against an accidental
result. The stipulated payments are to be made only if the bodily injury,
though unforeseen, is effected by means which are external and accidental."
The distinction is doubtless a somewhat artificial one and has the obvious
purpose on the part of the insurer of limiting liability, but it has practical
justification. See Note (1930) 78 U. Pa. L. Rev. 762. If the distinction were
not recognized in any of the countless situations to which it applies under this
type of general accident policy, insurers would almost surely be compelled
to raise premiums to compensate for increased liability, affecting the use-
fulness not only of ordinary but of Workmen's Compensation insurance as
well. And if it is to be retained, the majority opinion in the present case,
based on the rule that some unintended mischance must occur in the course
of action itself to constitute accidental means, seems the more logical one.
T. S. M., '36.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIoNs-LIABILnry FOR ToTs IN RECREATION CEN-
ms.-Two recent decisions typify the conflict which exists in the law
of municipal liability for negligence of employees in public recreation
centers. In Pennsylvania a girl eleven years old was injured when she
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fell from a swing in a public playground and struck a sharp and jagged
stone which lay in the path of the swing. The jury found that the attendant
was negligent in not removing the stone. Held: The city is liable for such
negligence, since the operation of a playground is analogous to operating a
park, and Pennsylvania has uniformly held a city liable for negligent main-
tenance of parks. Paraska a. City of Scranton (Pa. 1933) 169 Atl. 434. On
the other hand, in Illinois, a city ordinance created a recreation board which
among others had the power to provide swimming pools for the inhabitants.
The board made arrangements to provide the use of a pool eight miles away
and, employed one Smith to transport children thereto. The plaintiff, a
child, was injured when the auto in which she was being conveyed, collided
with another, due to Smith's negligence. Held: The city was not liable;
since the injury was the result of an accident in the course of a governmental
function. Village of La Grange Park v. Gebhart (Ill. 1933) 188 N. E. 372.
The general rule which holds the municipality liable for torts of its agents
in corporate functions and immune to liability for torts flowing from its
exercise of governmental functions is too well settled to cause any conflict.
City of Mobile v. Lartique (1930) 23 Ala. App. 479, 127 So. 257; Harris v.
D. of C. (1920) 256 U.S. 650; 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d ed.,
1928) sec. 2771; 19 R. C. L. 1081 et seq. The border line between the public
or governmental and the corporate or proprietary functions in many in-
stances is difficult to discern. It is in this "twilight zone" that the conflict
in the decisions occurs. The principal cases fall within this latter group.
Thus, there is a substantial contrariety of opinion in the courts of last
resort on the question as to whether the maintenance of parks, playgrounds,
and swimming pools is a governmental or proprietary function. The slight
weight of authority holds a municipality liable for negligent maintenance
of a park. Keller v. Los Angeles (1919) 179 Cal. 605, 178 Pac. 505; Bolster
v. Lawrence (1917) 225 Mass. 387, 114 N. E. 722, L. R. A. 1917B, 1285;
Heino v. Grand Rapids (1918) 202 Mich. 363, 168 N. W. 512, 29 A. L. R. 863.
Missouri and other states are committed to the view that a city must use
ordinary care in maintaining parks to make them reasonably safe for users
or else answer in damages. Capp v. St. Louis (1913) 251 Mo. 345, 158 S. V.
616, 46 A. L. R. (N. S.) 731; Barthold v. Phila. (1893) 154 Pa. 109,26 Atl. 304;
Silverman v. New York (1909) 14 N. Y. S. 59; Bloom v. Newark (1905) 3
Ohio N. P. N. S. 480. But, if a city derives profit from the operation of a
public park, it is deemed a proprietary function. Cornelisen v. Atlanta
(1917) 146 Ga. 416, 91 S. E. 415; Schmidt v. Berlin (1895) 26 Ont. Rep. 54.
Charges must in fact be made. Blair v. Granger (1902) 24 R. I. 14, 51 AtI.
1042; Bolster v. Lawrence, supra. It is not proprietary if profit is incidental
only. Blair v. Granger, supra; Hendricks v. Urbana Park Dist. (1932) 265
Ill. App. 102. When a city maintains a nuisance in a park it is liable for
injuries resulting therefrom. Harper v. Topeka (1914) 92 Kans. 11, 51
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1032. There are fewer cases in the books involving the
liability of cities for the negligent maintenance of swimming pools. A num-
ber of jurisdictions declare such function to be a governmental one, Nemet v.
Kenosha (1919) 169 Wis. 379, 172 N. W. 711; even though a charge was
made, Hannon a. Waterburg (Conn. 1927) 36 Atl. 876. Such is a corporate
function in other states. Belton v. Ellis (Tex. 1923) 175 N. Y. S. 274;
Burton v. Salt Lake City (1927) 69 Utah 186, 253 Pac. 443. A similar con-
flict exists with respect to the liability of a municipality in the operation of
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public playgrounds. 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d ed., 1928)
sec. 2860; 19 R. C. L. 1129.
In view of the tendency of recent decisions the rule is developing to charge
the city with a duty of care in maintaining parks, playgrounds, and like
recreation centers. See McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (1932 Supp.)
sec. 2859. At least, the city should be held responsible when a child is in-
jured in a playground or swimming pool. To hold otherwise is to establish
a rule of law which puts children at the mercy of dangerous conditions of
which they are not aware and over which they have no control, a result which
Paraska v. City of Scranton, supra, decides is not consonant with justice.
H. A. G., '35.
RES IPSA LOQUITUR-EXTENSION TO ELECTRICAL APPLIANEs.-The plain-
tiff, a country girl about nineteen years of age, went into the beauty shop of
the defendant and there ordered her first permanent wave. She was con-
ducted to the rear of the shop and after a shampoo her hair was wound up
on spindles and the current applied. She complained that the spindles
pulled her hair and later that her head was being burnt, but the attendants
declined to take action, assuring her that the curler could neither pull nor
burn. A day later she found her head severely burnt and blistered, causing
her intense pain for a month, and impairing her capacity to hear. Held:
The case is within the limits of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Glossip v.
Kelly (Mo. App. 1934) 67 S. W. (2d) 513.
The case seems to be in line with the prevailing view. The injury, ac-
cording to human experience, would not have been sustained unless there
was some imperfection in the instrument or negligence on the part of the
operator. The defendant's agents were in sole control and the plaintiff had
no way of telling what special negligence caused the injury. However,
the case marks an extension of the doctrine by the Missouri courts. There
are several general classes of cases in which the rule is applicable: (1) where
passengers are injured in a railroad wreck, McGoffln v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co.
(1891) 102 Mo. 540, 15 S. W. 76; Knox v. Missouri K. and T. Ry. Co. et al.
(1918) 199 Mo. App. 64, 203 S. W. 225; (2) where persons are injured by an
explosion of powder or dynamite. Holman v. Clark (1917) 272 Mo. 266, 198
S. W. 868; (3) where a person is injured by a falling object. McClosky v.
Koplar (1932) 329 Mo. 527, 46 S. W. (2d) 557; (4) where persons are
shocked or electrocuted by defective wires, telephones or other instruments,
Grady v. Louisiana Light, Power and Traction Co. (Mo. App. 1923) 253
S. W. 202; Joyce v. Missouri and Kansas Telephone Co. (Mo. App. 1918) 211
S. W. 900; Sprinkles v. Missouri Public Utilities Co. (Mo. App. 1916) 183
S. W. 1072. There is doubt whether the rule can be invoked today in the
case of injury from escaping gas, steam or water. The prevailing view in
America is that it does apply in the case of escaping gas, and early Missouri
cases held to the same effect. Sipple v. Laclede Gas Light Co. (1907)
125 Mo. App. 81, 102 S. W. 608. But later cases overruled this stand.
Brauer v. St. Louis County Gas Co. (Mo. App. 1922) 238 S. W. 519; Rede v.
St. Louis County Gas Co. (Mo. App. 1923) 254 S. W. 415. The situation
was complicated in Streck v. St. Louis County Gas Co. (Mo. App. 1933) 58
S. W. (2d) 487, where the plaintiff's gas supply was shut off, causing the
stove flame to be put out and then was turned on again, causing him injury.
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